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TRUTH COMMISSIONS IN EL SALVADOR 
AND GUATEMALA: A PROPOSAL FOR 
TRUTH IN GUATEMALA 
GREGORY JOWDY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As states emerge from years of civil strife and military rule, they 
struggle with how to recover the rule of law and put an end to gross 
human rights violations. l To accomplish this, governments are gradu-
ally recognizing the importance of addressing a past smeared with state 
sponsored violence.2 Truth commissions are becoming an effective 
mechanism with which to address this past. 3 
In 1992, EI Salvador established a truth commission as part of its 
peace process.4 This precedent-setting initiative has been praised for 
the accuracy and depth of its investigation.5 Future commissions can 
learn from the Salvadoran experience. Currently, Guatemala is pro-
ceeding through a peace process which is similar to that forged in EI 
Salvador.6 In addition to various other provisions, the Guatemalan 
peace accords provide for a truth commission.7 The Guatemalan Com-
mission should model itself after the strengths of the Salvadoran Com-
mission and improve upon its shortcomings. 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 See Priscilla Hayner, Democracies Unearth Political Crimes; Probing Acts of Official Brutality is 
Now a Worldwide Growth Industry, WORLDPAPER, Apr. 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Unearth Political 
Crimes]; see generally Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1979 to 1994: A Comparative 
Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994) [hereinafter Fifteen Commissions]. 
2 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 597-98. 
3 See id. 
4 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS, EL SALVADOR: ACCOUNTABILITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: THE REpORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR 2 
(1993) [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY]. 
5 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 599. 
6 See Trish O'Kane, Guatemala Rushes Toward a Fractured Peace, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Nov. 18, 1994, at 6. 
7 See id. at 2. 
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Uncovering the truth about the past, however, is only one phase 
in a nation's reconciliation.s A state should also seek justice for past 
human rights violations. This second component of peacemaking has 
been called the justice phase.9 At most, this phase involves the govern-
ment prosecuting the perpetrators of past human rights abuses; at 
least, this phase includes the government and the perpetrators them-
selves formally acknowledging responsibility.lo However, the reconcili-
ation process often fails to reach this point because governments often 
issue amnesty laws which effectively prevent the formal treatment of 
perpetrators and implicitly reject or deny the truth commission re-
port. ll In El Salvador, after the Truth Commission publicly issued its 
report, the Government passed a blanket amnesty along with formal 
statements rejecting the Commission's conclusions. 12 
Actors in the Guatemalan peace process should take steps to 
prevent this likely reaction from the Government and the military not 
only because it stifles the effectiveness of the peace process and recon-
ciliation, but also because international human rights law mandates 
that perpetrators of human rights abuses be prosecuted.13 Although 
prosecution may seem practically impossible and even adverse to na-
tional reconciliation, it should not be precluded by a blanket amnesty 
law. Alternatives to blanket amnesties exist which are neither stifling 
to the acknowledgment/justice phase of the peace process nor violative 
of international human rights law. 14 
This Note makes proposals to the Guatemalan Commission based 
on arguments derived from policy, law, and the Salvadoran experience. 
Specifically, Part II introduces truth commissions as a peacemaking 
mechanism. Parts III and IV discuss the Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
Commissions, respectively, in their historical contexts. Part V explores 
issues surrounding truth commissions and makes proposals for the 
Guatemalan Commission. Part VI proposes that the Guatemalan Com-
mission strive to preclude an amnesty. Finally, Part VII provides alter-
natives to an amnesty for Guatemala. 
8 See NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 4-5 (1995). 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 See id.; ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 14. 
12 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 20-23. 
13 See infra notes 357-85 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 386-408 and accompanying text. 
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II. TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
A. Introduction to Truth Commissions 
Mter years of military rule and civil strife, most incoming govern-
ments face a history of human rights abuses. I5 Addressing these past 
abuses in some manner is imperative to the success of the new govern-
ment. I6 Victims and their families often demand reparations of some 
sort to help them heal, forgive, and satisfy a need for justice. This need, 
if not satisfied by the civil government, might inspire vigilantism that 
would inevitably fuel further conflict. Additionally, on a societal level, 
the success of the new government depends on an end to the climate 
of impunity and a return to a rule of lawP These demands must be 
met by the new government in order to establish a sustainable peace 
and prevent further human rights abuses. Is 
One mechanism used to meet these demands in recent years is 
the truth commission. I9 Generally, a truth commission is a body estab-
lished through internal or international processes for the primary 
purpose of investigating alleged past human rights abuses.2o They are 
growing as a means to reconcile a country in transition from civil strife 
to sustainable democracy.21 In the last twenty years, there have been 
fifteen truth commissions in thirteen different countries.22 
Truth commissions typically serve three functions which are vital 
to the successful transition from civil strife to a sustainable peace: they 
have a cathartic effect for populations who have suffered egregious 
human rights abuses; they demonstrate a break with the past for a new 
government which thereby promotes national reconciliation; and they 
15 See Unearth Political Crimes, supra note I, at 1. In Ihis Note, human rights abuses are acts 
such as torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 8. 
18 See Unearth Political Crimes, supra note I, at 598. 
19 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note I, at 598. 
20 See id. This definition should only be taken in Ihe broadest sense given Ihe short history 
and variability of trulh commissions. See id. In fact, Priscilla B. Hayner remarks, "Outside of Ihe 
attention given to Ihe two or Ihree more well-known commissions in Latin America, Ihere has 
been little comparative research in Ihis area .... No definition ... of trulh commissions [has] 
been identified." Id. at 598. 
21 See Unearth Political Crimes, supra note I, at 1; see also Fifteen Commissions, supra note I, 
at 598. 
22 See Unearth Political Crimes, supra note I, at 1. 
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manifest the new government's respect for and commitment to human 
rights.23 
M. CherifBassiouni, a DePaul University law professor and former 
United Nations chief investigator in Yugoslavia, explains that the mo-
tive behind truth commissions is not revenge but to bring the truth to 
light.24 These commissions are fueled by the belief that perpetrators of 
war crimes "must be brought to book, by history and an outraged world 
if not by a normal court. "25 If for no other reason, moral responsibility 
to bring out the truth demands that states account for past war crimes.26 
Although truth commissions vary in structure, mandate, and suc-
cess, which makes definition difficult, they are generally characterized 
by four parameters: (1) they focus on the past; (2) they try to paint an 
overall picture of rights abuses; (3) they exist for a temporary, pre-
defined period of time; and (4) they are vested with authority from the 
sponsor which provides them with access to information and security.27 
A truth commission can be evaluated based on certain standards 
which academics have distilled from practice and history.28 A successful 
commission is generally welcomed by survivors, victims, and human 
rights advocates. Furthermore, it produces a report that is widely read 
and distills a summary of the facts that is received by all parties as 
conclusive and fair.29 Beyond these general characteristics and stand-
ards, however, each commission is tailored to and evaluated by the 
particular circumstances of the conflict and country. 30 
23 See id. at 2. Jose Zalaquett, a Commissioner on the Chilean Commission, remarks, 
The contact with so many families of victims convinced me of the paramount 
importance and cathartic power of seeking to establish the truth .... The families 
had refused to allow the previous government authorities to see them cry as they 
searched for their loved ones. But now they were being received with respect and 
offered a seat and a cup of coffee . . . . At first, we did not realize that the very 
process of seeking the truth was thus also a patient process of cleansing wounds, 
one byone. 
ld. at 10. See Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497, 539 (1994), for a similar account regarding the cathartic effect in the 
Salvadoran experience. 
24 See R.C. Longworth, War Crimes Tribunal; Digging For Truth in the Killing Fields, CHI. TRIB., 
Oct. 15, 1995, at 1. 
25 ld. 
26 See id. 
27 See Unearth Political Crimes, supra note 1, at 2. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id.; Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 635. 
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B. Reasons for a Truth Commission 
1. The Right to Truth 
Although international law does not mandate truth commissions 
per se, it imposes on governments a duty to investigate human rights 
abuses.31 A truth commission is one means by which a government can 
fulfill this duty.32 
Professor Naomi Roht-Arriaza finds the duty to investigate in both 
treaty and non treaty sources of international law. 33 In treaty based law, 
for instance, Article 12 of The Convention Against Torture requires 
each party to promptly investigate alleged acts of torture.34 Meanwhile, 
comprehensive human rights instruments, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention 
on Human Rights, establish substantive rights that require investiga-
tion for their enforcement.35 In fact, the bodies created to monitor and 
enforce these treaties have made clear that states have a duty to inves-
tigate alleged violations.36 
These comprehensive human rights treaties have established the 
duty to investigate within customary non treaty international law. Pro-
fessor Roht-Arriaza asserts that treaties which are universal in character 
and which reflect the practice of states are sources of international 
customary law.37 Although a state may not be a signatory to a treaty, it 
is still subject to customary international law. Therefore, where treaties 
fail to impose the duty to investigate past human rights abuses on a 
particular state, customary international law fills the gap.38 
31 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 24-32, 39-49. 
32 See id. at 7; Fifteen Commissions, supra note I, at 611. The more conventional mechanisms 
with which to fulfill this duty are properly functioning law enforcement and judicial systems. See 
ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 7; Fifteen Commissions, supra note I, at 611. However, in countries 
where these systems are struggling with their past, exceptional measures such as truth commis-
sions are sometimes necessary to both fulfill this duty and re-establish these conventional mecha-
nisms. See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 4; Unearth Political Crimes, supra note I, at 1. 
33 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 24-32, 39-49. Professor Roht-Arriaza teaches interna-
tional human rights law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. See id. at xii. 
34 See id. at 27. 
35 See id. at 29. 
36 See id. at 28. 
37 See id. at 40-41. 
38 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 39. Treaty-based law has a number of weaknesses in 
imposing a duty to investigate past abuses. See id. First, treaty obligations only apply to conduct 
that occurs after the treaty was signed by the state in question. See id. Second, a state that 
"systematically violates human rights abuses may be particularly disinclined to adhere to human 
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2. Political Justifications 
In addition to being mandated by international law, fulfilling the 
duty to investigate-particularly through a truth commission39-has 
many practical and political justifications.4o Amnesty International ad-
vocates the investigation of past violations as a primary means to 
prevent future rights abuses,4l 
Many states in transition from authoritarian rule to democratic 
rule face a general climate of lawlessness and impunity.42 This lawless-
ness disempowers ordinary citizens, "making them fearful to think or 
speak out [against the government] breeding cynicism and passivity. "43 
Therefore, the establishment of an effective democracy, which requires 
ordinary citizens to participate, demands the end of impunity and the 
recovery of the rule of law.44 Additionally, as a state moves from a 
period of lawlessness to the rule of law, it will often face a history of 
grave human rights abuses perpetrated by its government officials.45 
Acknowledging the past abuses perpetrated by officials is many times 
a new or reformed government's first step towards recovering the rule 
of law.46 Truth commissions are an effective mechanism for acknow-
ledging the past. 
rights treaty [obligations]." Id. For a further discussion of the right to truth and the concomitant 
duty to investigate in international law, see Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing but 
the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 B.U. INT'L 
LJ. 321, 329-36 (1994). 
39 See ROHT-A!mIAZA, supra note 8, at 24-56. 
40 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 607-11. 
41 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER; POLITICAL KiLLINGS AND 
'DISAPPEARANCES' IN THE 1990s lOO-Ol (1993). "Can a government hope to end gross human 
rights violations if they don't confront the past?" Id. at 92. Amnesty International strongly suggests 
that a government cannot. See id. 
42 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 4. 
431d. 
44 See id. at 3. 
45 See id. Impunity is a state of lawlessness which is a leading contributor to human rights 
abuses. See id. at 4. It is the absence of the rule of law. See id. In this state, inhumane acts are 
carried out, usually by state or quasi-state actors, without fear of repercussion. See id. at 3. The 
treatment of these officials is the first opportunity a society faces in promoting the rule of law. 
See id. However, their treatment must be within a system of law. See id. Inflicting vengeful 
punishment on these "former rulers, torturers, and jailers" in summary proceedings without 
legitimate due process protections is not effective in the establishment of the rule of law because 
this process would be no less arbitrary than the former government's actions. See id. On the other 
hand, if the new government avoids treating these individuals in the form of a "blanket amnesty 
and silence," then the new government perpetuates the climate of impunity "by creating a 
separate class to whom the rule of law does not apply." Id. 
46 See id. at 4, 8. However, not everyone agrees that truth promotes reconciliation. Many 
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Acknowledgment implies that the state has admitted its misdeeds 
and recognized that it was wrong.47 This virtual apology promotes 
national reconciliation and prevents the past from being repeated.48 
For a new regime, a truth commission distinguishes the new legitimate 
government from former abusive governments; it demonstrates a com-
mitment to promoting human rights and respecting the rule of law; 
and it helps to legitimize the authority and strengthen the popularity 
of a new head of state.49 
Formal acknowledgment of past human rights abuses not only 
helps to heal a country but also helps to heal individuals. 50 For the 
victims and their families, formal recognition dispels any doubt about 
what occurred and subsequently puts the past to rest.51 Only at this 
point can the healing begin. This formal acknowledgment is especially 
important for families of the disappeared, who live for years doubting 
whether or not their loved ones are still alive.52 
Besides addressing the past, a truth commission can also help the 
new government by addressing the future. 53 Many commissions end 
their report with recommendations for the new government.54 These 
recommendations are usually crafted as proposals for systematic re-
form which would prevent future periods of impunity and subsequent 
human rights abuses.55 Although these recommendations are not al-
governments and government officials argue that dredging up the truth revives old and creates 
new rifts in society. See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 609. These arguments are propounded 
by the same governments and government officials who are responsible for the past abuses which 
are to be investigated. See id. In response, human rights experts contend that no commission has 
caused a situation to become worse. See id. at 610. Although it is generally agreed that impunity 
is a leading contributor to human rights abuses and that the rule of law is necessary to end a 
climate of impunity, there is little agreement about what to do with past impunity and human 
rights abuses. See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 7-8. Some commentators suggest that it is best 
to leave the past alone, and that such an investigation into the past will do more harm than good 
by dredging up old hatreds. See id. at 8. 
47 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 8; Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 607. This is not 
to say that nongovernmental parties in a conflict are not investigated as well, nor does it imply 
that they should not be held accountable. See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 8. In fact, a 
successful truth commission and well-received report necessarily include the whole, objective 
truth regardless of whom they implicate. See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 636. 
48 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 607. Providing "an honest account of violence 
prevents history from being lost or re-written, and allows a society to learn from the past .... " Id. 
49 See id. at 608. 
50 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 7-8. 
51 See id. at 8. 
52 See id. 
53 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 609. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
292 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:285 
ways mandatory, 56 they are at least persuasive in that they come from 
a quasi-governmental and formally recognized organ. As such, they 
provide points around which civil society can lobby. 57 
C. Truth Commissions in Latin America 
Arguably, truth commissions originated in Latin America. At the 
least, the most frequently cited or most well-established commissions 
are those formed during the Latin American peace processes. 58 In 
response to the military dictatorships from the late 1960s to the early 
1980s, Latin Americans searched for accountability for human rights 
abuses.59 These military dictatorships "systematically tortured, 'disap-
peared,' and murdered thousands of civilians in the name of national 
security. "60 Although there were actual subversive groups in several 
South American countries, many civilians were unjustly persecuted by 
agents of the state for allegedly "subversive" activity.61 When new gov-
ernments took over, civilians demanded truth and justice through an 
accounting of the victims, official acknowledgment, and even punish-
ment of the perpetrators.62 
III. EL SALVADOR 
A. Brief History of the Conflict 
El Salvador, with a population of five million,63 has suffered for 
centuries from a severe maldistribution of resources, particularly ar-
able land.64 Land has been held by a very small liberal elite while 
thousands have suffered in poverty.65 Much of the Salvadoran civil 
conflict springs from this division between a landed elite and an im-
poverished peasantry. 
56 See id. In the Salvadoran process, however, the parties did accept the recommendations as 
binding on them. See Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 533. 
57 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note I, at 609. 
58 See id. at 598-99. 
59 See id.; ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 4. 
60 ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 4. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See NEW AMERICAN DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA 409 (1989). El Salvador's population consists of 
89% Mestizo, 10% Indian, and 1 % white. See id. 
64 SeeJoHN A. BOOTH & THOMAS W. WALKER, UNDERSTANDING CENTRAL AMERICA 36 (1993). 
65 See id. at 36--37. This class is so notoriously small that it is sometimes referred to as the 
"fourteen families." See id. 
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El Salvador was ruled by a liberal elite during most of its first 
century as an independent state.66 This class promoted a policy of 
modernization through increasing agricultural exports and expanding 
the country's infrastructure.67 At this time, the indigenous Indian popu-
lation was seen as both an obstacle and a cheap source of labor.6s 
The origins of popular movements are found in the late 19th 
century.69 As the demand for coffee in international markets increased, 
the elites moved into the Indian held highlands, which were conducive 
to coffee production.70 They established laws prohibiting communal 
ownership, which effectively transferred ownership of the valuable 
highlands to the ruling elite. 71 In response, popular groups began to 
organize and the conflict began to take shape.72 
The first mass revolt occurred in 1932 in the wake of a grave 
depression. 73 In response, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez 
led a military massacre of 30,000 peasants, few of whom were actual 
insurgents. 74 The leader of the masses, Augustin Farabundo Marti, a 
Marxist intellectual who was captured and beheaded as a result of the 
uprising,75 has become the apostle of the modern revolutionary move-
ment.76 
During the next fifty years, El Salvador was ruled by "an uninter-
rupted series of military regimes" which succeeded the liberal elite. 77 
However, the marriage between the landed class and the military would 
continue to mark Salvadoran history.7s In the 1960s, mild democratic 
reforms were stifled when the ruling elite began to feel threatened and 
subsequently urged the military to crack down. 79 Attempts at reform 
continued into the 1970s with the election of reformist candidate Jose 
Napoleon Duarte.so President Duarte's efforts, however, were suppressed 
66 See id. at 36. El Salvador won independence in 1823. See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 36. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 36-37. 
72 See id. at 37. 
73 See id. 
74 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 37. 
75 See id. 
76 See SAUL LANDAU, THE GUERRILLA WARS OF CENTRAL AMERICA: NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR 
AND GUATEMALA 67 (1993). 
77 See id. 
78 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 37-38; LANDAU, supra note 76, at 68. 
79 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 38. 
80 See id. 
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by the military.81 A popular revolt on the military barracks on behalf 
of Duarte led the military to arrest, torture, and exile him.82 The 
military then installed a rightist in Duarte's place.83 
Popular movements grew throughout the 1970s.84 Widespread un-
rest among the working classes due to deteriorating economic condi-
tions fueled mass mobilization as well as the dawn of liberation theol-
ogy.85 Jesuit priests began working with the poor and using the Bible 
to heighten awareness of the pervasive economic and political injus-
tices.86 This spurred protests, peasant organization, and social pressure 
for change.87 In response, the government "unleashed a wave of terror 
that was taking over lOOO lives per month by 1979."88 
In 1979, El Salvador descended into civil war following an initially 
reformist coup d'etat.89 A civilian-military junta came to power and 
brought together the military, businesses, and the Social Democratic 
and Christian Democratic parties.90 However, the junta's disregard for 
human rights repelled many moderates who did not want to be pup-
pets of this abusive regime.91 The dissenters joined with leftist parties to 
form the Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democratico Revolu-
cionario-FDR).92 Meanwhile, five Marxist guerrilla groups united to 
form the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo 
Marti de Liberacion Nacional-FMLN).93 Together the FDR and the 
FMLN formed the revolutionary movement.94 
The civil war proceeded throughout the 1980s resulting in ap-
proximately 70,000 deaths.95 Throughout the war, the right wing, sup-
ported in large part by the United States, refused to negotiate.96 In one 
attempt, the FMLN offered to participate in the upcoming 1989 elec-
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 39; LANDAU, supra note 76, at 74-75. 
85 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 39. 
86 See LANDAU, supra note 76, at 77. 
87 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 39. 
88Id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 40-42. 
91 See id. at 42. 
92 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 42. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. at 103. 
96 See id. 
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tions if the Government would postpone the elections for six months 
to install safeguards which would ensure a fair election.97 The Govern-
ment refused,98 To demonstrate their commitment and strength, the 
FMLN intensified their ultimately successful offensive in San Salva-
dor.99 In 1991, the two sides entered peace talks under U.N. supervi-
sion. lOo 
The peace agreement signed in 1992 provided that the FMLN 
would demobilize. lol In return, the Government would depoliticize and 
downscale the army, phase out many of the counter-insurgency armed 
forces, and create a new police force which included former FMLN 
members.I02 Furthermore, this agreement set forth the terms of a truth 
commission. 103 
B. The Salvadoran Truth Commission 
In 1983, Argentina, emerging from years of military rule, estab-
lished a commission to report on thousands of disappearances. lo4 In 
1990, Chile established a broader commission to investigate all human 
rights violations which occurred during the previous years of military 
dictatorship.105 In the shadow of these commissions, the Salvadoran 
Commission was established.106 
Human Rights Watch has hailed the Salvadoran Commission as 
unprecedented. 107 Several factors have been cited as integral to its 
success. First, the Salvadoran Commission was forged from a negoti-
ated peace. In this way, the Salvadoran Commission is in contrast to 
the Commissions of Chile and Argentina, for example, which were 
formed by a successor government's investigation of its predecessor 
regime. lOs Second, the Commission operated under international aus-
pices rather than under the new Government. 109 Finally, for the first 
97 See BOOTH & WALKER. supra note 64, at 103. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 103-04. 
100 See id.; LANDAU, supra note 76, at 145. 
101 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 105. 
102 See id. 
103 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 7. 
104 See id. at 4. 
105 See id. at 5. 
\06 See id. 
107 See id. at 2-4, 24, 36. 
108 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 2-4; see also Pasqualucci, supra note 38, at 336-40. 
109 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 7. 
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time since Nuremberg, internationals investigated past acts of violence 
in a sovereign country.no 
The Salvadoran Commission provides an appropriate model for 
uncovering Guatemala's past injustices. To begin with, the Guatemalan 
Commission arises in a similar context to that of the Salvadoran Com-
mission, as the underlying civil conflict in both countries is compara-
ble. Additionally, both Commissions were born of a negotiated peace!!! 
and involve international actors.ll2 Finally, both Commissions face simi-
lar challenges in their goal of healing years of strife, death, and disap-
pearances. 
C. Initiation and Structure of the Salvadoran Commission 
The Salvadoran Commission was a three member U.N. delegation 
with a mandate to probe the 22,000 murders, kidnappings, and cases of 
torture that occurred during the eleven year civil war (1980-1991).113 
Mter six months, as prescribed by the 1992 peace agreement, the 
Commission produced a report that highlighted well-known and typi-
cal cases.n4 The report found Government actors responsible for 5100 
deaths and 1600 acts of violence and the FMLN responsible for 400 
deaths and 300 disappearances. 115 
The report ended with a series of recommendations which in-
cluded requiring "immediate action" and promoting "national reconcili-
ation. "116 Although the recommendations for immediate action called 
for the dismissal of certain Government and military officials, the 
Commission did not suggest prosecution or argue against an amnesty.ll7 
They reasoned that the Salvadoran justice system was not "capable of 
doing justice" and that an amnesty was an issue for the Salvadoran 
people. ll8 Among those recommendations for national reconciliation, 
110 See id. 
III See O'Kane, supra note 6, at 1. 
112 See id. 
113 See Longworth, supra note 24, at 5. 
114 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 15. 
115 See The Peace Process in El Salvador, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, lOlst Congo 3 (1993) [hereinafter Peace Process 
Hearings] (testimony of Belisario Betancur, President of Truth Commission). The government 
actors included the military, which was responsible for 4300 deaths, the security forces, which 
were responsible for 1600 deaths, and the death squads, which were responsible for 800. See id. 
116 See Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 536. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 535-36. Nevertheless, only five days after the report was released, an amnesty 
protecting those named in the report was pushed through the legislature. [d. 
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the Commission proposed that the Government offer material com-
pensation to the families of victims and build a monument to the 
victims of the civil war.1l9 
As mentioned above, this Commission was established by a 1992 
U.N.-sponsored peace agreement signed by the FMLN and the Gov-
ernment.120 Negotiations leading to this final agreement began in April 
1990 when the initial meeting took place. 121 From the initial meeting 
in April 1990, the FMLN, the Government, and the United Nations all 
expressed concerns about impunity and the investigation of past abuses.122 
The FMLN called for the investigation of a number of high-profile 
cases that would be exemplary of the Government's misdeeds.123 The 
Government insisted that the FMLN enjoyed impunity and that they 
should be investigated as well. 124 Meanwhile, the United Nations rec-
ognized that a sustainable peace must address the human rights viola-
tions which were identified as a source of the conflict.125 
These differences were finally resolved in late 1990 when the 
parties agreed, without setting forth details, to an investigative commis-
sion.126 The Government finally assented because the creation of a 
commission allowed avoidance of formal military prosecution and 
because it won the concession that the FMLN would also be investi-
gated.127 The FMLN did not strongly object to being investigated be-
cause it viewed the Government as the perpetrator of "the vast majority 
of abuses. "128 
Once the idea was accepted, the first issue was whether the Com-
mission would be comprised of Salvadoran nationals or internation-
als.129 The FMLN argued that "any Salvadoran delving into notorious 
human rights cases would face mortal danger and therefore would 
avoid investigating cases in depth."13o The Government argued that 
national sovereignty required that "the past be examined only by Sal-
119 See id. at 536. 
120 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 7. 
121 See id. at 5-7. 
122 See id. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 5-7. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
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vadoran citizens."131 The United Nations favored a commission of in-
ternationals in order to protect the security, impartiality, and prestige 
of the Commission.132 In the end, the Salvadoran Government con-
ceded to an investigative commission of internationals.133 However, the 
Government succeeded in insulating the military by placing a condi-
tion on its concession: the separate Ad Hoc Commission established 
to view the records of military officers would be composed of Sal-
vadorans.134 
Next, the parties considered the Commission's mandate and dis-
cussed exactly which cases it would investigate.135 Initially, each side 
submitted a list of suggested cases. 136 Eventually, they accepted the U.N. 
recommendation that the Commissioners themselves decide which 
cases to investigate. 137 
One year after negotiations began on April 27, 1991, the parties 
signed the accord formally establishing a Commission on the Truth.138 
This accord provided the terms of the Commission. 139 The Commission 
was mandated to "investigate grave acts of violence which have oc-
curred since 1980 and whose impact on society demands most urgently 
public knowledge of the truth. "140 It would be composed of three 
members designated by the U.N. Secretary General, with input from 
the parties.141 Ultimately, the Commission was to issue recommenda-
tions "destined to prevent the repetition of violent acts and to foster 
national reconciliation. "142 The Commission would not have judicial 
powers.143 Instead, it would present a final report including its findings 
and recommendations six months after its installation.144 
131Id. 
132 See id. at 7. 
133 See id. at 6-7. 
134 See id. The Ad Hoc Commission was established as part of the negotiations to review the 
military regarding respect for human rights, professionalism, and democratic commitment. See 
id. at 8. At the end of its review, this Commission, composed of three Guatemalan civilians, called 
for the dismissal or transfer of 103 military officers. See id. The Truth Commission report named 
many of the same officers, which increased pressure on the Government to comply. See id. at 9-10. 
135 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 7. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 7. 
141 See id. 
142Id. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
1997] TRUTH COMMISSIONS 299 
The three Commissioners, along with their staff of twenty lawyers, 
social scientists, and other human rights professionals from nongov-
ernmental organizations, began work on July 14, 1992.145 The Commis-
sion operated a main office in San Salvador and three regional offices 
at which investigators heard testimony regarding human rights viola-
tions from anyone who came forward. 146 The Commission attracted 
witnesses through an "extensive publicity campaign" advertising its 
purpose and presence on television and radio. 147 In addition to collecting 
direct and indirect testimony, Commission staff and members searched 
for documentation inside and outside the country.148 On March 15, 
1993, eight months after beginning investigations, the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations released the report. 149 
Generally, the Commission concluded that 
[t]he violence carried out by the government forces ... origi-
nated in a political mind set that viewed political opponents 
as subversives and enemies . . . . Rural deaths were part of a 
deliberate strategy of eliminating or terrifying the peasant 
population in areas where the guerrillas were active, the pur-
pose being to deprive the guerrilla forces of this source of 
supplies and information.150 
Furthermore, the "Commission reported that it was considered 
legitimate to physically eliminate people who were labeled mili-
tary targets, traitors or orejas (informers), and even political oppo-
nents."15I 
145 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 10. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. at 14. The report has five sections: Introduction, Methodology, a chronological 
overview of the history of violence from 1980 to 1991, report on the cases studied, and recom-
mendations. See generally THE TRUTH COMMISSION FOR EL SALVADOR, FROM MADNESS TO HOPE: 
THE TwELVE YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR: REpORT OF THE COMMISSION ON TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR 
(1993) [hereinafter FROM MADNESS TO HOPE]. The Introduction describes the purposes and 
objectives of the commission. See id. at 11. The Methodology section describes the process or 
procedure used by the commission. See id. at 114-15. The cases studied section reports on the 
cases, which can be divided into six categories. See id. at 115-16. These categories include specific 
cases, such as the killing of six Jesuit priests, as well as generalized patterns of violence, such as 
forced disappearances. See id. at 116-17. The report ends with eight recommendations "aimed 
at removing human rights violators from public offices, reforming the justice system and the 
Armed Forces, as well as to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and national 
reconciliation." Id. at 117. 
150 ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 14. 
151Id. at 14-15. 
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D. Reaction to the Commission's Report lJy the Salvadoran Government 
The Salvadoran Government rejected the report through both 
official statements and legislative action.152 Numerous high officials in 
the executive branch, the military, the judiciary, and the ruling legis-
lative party denounced the report as unresponsive to the demands of 
the majority, devoid of objectivity, and beyond its mandate. 153 Americas 
Watch summarized the Government's reaction as a ''violent rejection 
of the report" which reflected the Government's unwillingness to con-
front the past and seek reconciliation based on accountability.l54 
Conversely, the FMLN unanimously accepted the report and seemed 
willing to abide by its recommendations.155 However, their compliance 
is conditioned upon commensurate acceptance by the Government.156 
Norma Guevara, the spokeswoman for the FMLN, said, ''We under-
stand that our acceptance demands that all people mentioned in the 
report accept their responsibilities and that all the truth commission 
recommendations must be met. "157 
In violation of a law passed only one year prior, the Salvadoran 
Legislature took formal action to reject the Truth Commission's re-
port.15S Early in the peace process on February 1, 1992, the Salvadoran 
Legislature had passed the "Law of National Reconciliation."159 This 
law was a limited amnesty which protected from punishment rebel 
combatants who laid down their weapons. l60 Additionally, this law ex-
plicitly provided that more extensive amnesty action could not be taken 
until six months after the release of the Truth Commission report.161 
Nevertheless, only five days after the publication of the report in 1993, 
the Salvadoran Legislature violated the Law of National Reconciliation 
by passing a general amnesty law which effectively barred the prosecu-
tion of anyone named in the report.162 
152 See id. at 20-23. 
153 See id. at 20-2l. 
154 See id. at 20. 
155 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 22. 
156 See id. at 22-23. 
157Id. at 22. 
158 See id. at 20, 23. 
159 See id. at 23. 
160 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 23. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. The law granted "'broad, absolute, and unconditional amnesty' for all those who 
participated ... in criminal acts which occurred before January 1, 1992." Id. The law stated that 
such acts included "political crimes or any crime with political ramifications, or common crimes 
committed by no less than twenty people." Id. 
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IV. GUATEMALA 
A. Brief History of the Conflict 
Guatemala has been described as two countries. One of these 
countries is composed of Mayan Indians who constitute fifty-five per-
cent of Guatemala's total population and who occupy the highlands 
and rural areas. 163 The other country, which comprises the remainder 
of the population, generally consists of mixed-blood Ladinos. 164 Guate-
mala's history is characterized broadly as one of oppression and strug-
gle. 165 Beginning with the Spanish conquest in 1524, the indigenous 
people have struggled to reclaim their land and overcome oppression 
at the hands of the Ladino land-holding elite. 166 
True representative government emerged in Guatemala for the 
first time in 1945.167 However, it ended in 1954 when the Government 
was overthrown by forces resisting a radical and progressive land re-
form policy.168 Years later, in 1962, armed resistance began to emerge 
in response to the oppression.169 A division in the army led "nationalist 
minded officers" to dissent and join the Communist partyPo These 
revolutionary groups evolved into the Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas 
Armadas Rebeldes-FAR), which eventually joined other guerrilla groups 
and the Guatemalan Workers Party to form the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Union (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca-
URNG), the current political and military command of the rebel move-
ment. l7l 
Since the formation of the rebel movement in 1962, Guatemala 
has been governed by a counterinsurgency policy.172 This policy re-
sulted in the deaths of 23,000 people between 1966 and 1973 in rural 
areas under the presidencies of Julio Mendez Montenegro and Colonel 
Arana. 173 
163 See JEAN- MARIE SIMON, GUATEMALA: ETERNAL SPRING ETERNAL TYRANNY 19 (1987). 
Guatemala's total population is approximately 8.5 million people. See id. 
164 See id. 
165 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 109-12. 
166 See SIMON, supra note 163, at 20. 
167 See id. at 18, 20. 
168 See id. at 21. 
169 See TOM BARRY, CENTRAL AMERICA INSIDE OUT 241 (1991). 
170 See id. 
171 See id. at 242. 
172 See SIMON, supra note 163, at 24. 
173 See id. at 24-25. 
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Throughout the 1970s, the rebel forces, insurgency, and popular 
movements expanded.174 General Romero Lucas Garcia, in an effort 
to annihilate the resistance, initiated what is known as "the years of 
violence."175 This period, from 1978 to 1984, resulted in 100,000 killed, 
40,000 disappeared, 750,000 internally displaced, and 250,000 refugees 
in Mexico. 176 This crack-down was justified as essential to the eradica-
tion of the violent communist uprising.177 
Mter he staged a coup in 1982, the counterinsurgency program 
developed by General Efrain Rios Monu shifted from one of brutal 
violence to rural pacification.178 The program now involved the forced 
relocation of thousands of indigenous peasants to military controlled 
areas called "model villages. "179 This control structure exists today in a 
modified form through the civil patrols and the militarization of the 
highland communities. ISO 
In 1986, the first civilian president in twenty years was elected by 
a constituent assembly. lSI Human rights and grassroots organizations 
flourished during the early years of this presidency. However, growing 
military intolerance of the organizations led to increased assassina-
tions, disappearances, and harassment of human rights and commu-
nity activists. 182 
The early nineties were marked by hope due to the peaceful 
civilian transfer of government to Jorge Serrano Elias, who initiated 
his "total peace plan" to end the Civil War. IS3 Unfortunately, his plan 
was ineffective against military impunity, and the human rights situ-
ation deteriorated. The Human Rights Ombudsman recorded 456 
extrajudicial killings in 1992. IS4 
174 See id. at 25. 
175 See id. at 29. 
176 See LANDAU, supra note 76, at 184. 
177 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 1l0. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS, CLOSING THE SPACE: HUMAN RiGHTS IN GUATE-
MALA MAY 1987-0CTOBER 1988, at 1 (1988) [hereinafter CLOSING THE SPACE]. 
181 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 111: CLOSING THE SPACE, supra note 180, at 7. 
182 See BOOTH & WALKER, supra note 64, at 113; CLOSING THE SPACE, supra note 180, at 8. 
183 See HUMAN RiGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS, GUATEMALA: GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER 2 
(1991) [hereinafter GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER]; ROBERT H. TRUDEAU, GUATEMALAN POLI-
TICS: THE POPULAR STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 175 (1993). 
184 See GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER, supra note 183, at 2. 
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Mter Serrano attempted a self-coup in June 1993, the military 
forced him to resign. 1s5 This led to the election of Ramiro de Leon 
Carpio, the outspoken Human Rights Ombudsman under Serrano.186 
Carpio was elected by Congress upon strong international and popular 
support. 187 The promise that Carpio's government appeared to bring 
to the human rights situation soon deteriorated.1s8 "And with the rise 
of both political and ordinary criminal violence in the latter part of 
1993 and early 1994, the government's failure in investigating and 
prosecuting crimes seriously eroded its legitimacy."189 
In March of 1994, after thirty-four years of civil war and six years 
of stop-start talks, Carpio's government signed a peace agreement with 
the URNG.190 The March 1994 agreement on human rights was signed 
as part of U.N.-sponsored peace talks between the parties. 191 This initial 
agreement set a timetable for further discussions which were to culmi-
nate in the signing of a comprehensive, final accord in December 
1994.192 Although that date was not met, the parties proceeded with 
the scheduled four rounds of talks and signed subsequent agreements, 
including an agreement establishing a truth commission.193 In addition 
to providing a timetable, the initial agreement included the following 
provisions: 
l. UN human rights verification mission which will monitor 
and report on the human rights situation and strengthen 
domestic human rights monitoring institutions. 194 
2. A promise by the government not to promote an amnesty 
for those who have violated human rights. 195 
185 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA DURING PRESI' 
DENT DE LEON CARPIO'S FIRST YEAR 3 (1994) [hereinafter DE LEON CARPIO REpORT]. 
186 See id. at 2. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
189Id. 
190 See O'Kane, supra note 6, at 1. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. Other issues discussed or scheduled to be discussed in the peace talks were 
indigenous rights, land reform, the role of the military, and demobilization of guerrilla forces by 
the end of the year. See id. 
194DE LEON CARPIO REpORT, supra note 185, at 8. 
195Id. at 9. This promise is probably limited to actions of the executive-amnesty is often 
issued as a law by the legislature. See infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text. This was the case 
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3. A promise to modify its penal code to include forced 
disappearances and extra judicial executions.196 
Although this initial agreement showed promise, its impact was 
negligible. As reported by the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop, 
human rights violations increased after the signing of the accord. 197 
Political killings and disappearances doubled in the first six months of 
1994 as compared to the first half of 1993.198 As of November 1994, 
reports indicated that security controls continued to intimidate wit-
nesses, judges, and even the police in an environment of lawlessness 
and impunity.199 
Throughout 1995, Civil Patrol and military intimidation, violence, 
and impunity continued.20o Early in 1995, "an association of armed civil 
patrollers attacked Guatemalans and took international officials hos-
tage to stop refugee repatriation .... "201 Prior to this attack, the Gov-
ernment and refugees had signed an accord ensuring the safe return 
of the refugees.202 The attack, therefore, violated the accord. 203 Never-
theless, the civilian authorities refused to prosecute the identified 
perpetrator and the military authorities refused to disarm the civil 
patrollers involved.204 On October 5, 1995, uniformed troops fired on 
a crowd of returning refugees in northern Guatemala, "killing eleven 
villagers, including two young children, and wounding more than 
thirty others. "205 
in El Salvador. The issue of Amnesty in Guatemala following the report is still very contentious. 
See Telephone Interview with Gretta Tovar, Human Rights Watch/Americas Guatemala Expert 
(Nov. 5, 1996). In fact, Americas Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch, held a conference 
in Guatemala which drafted a document proclaiming the importance of not passing an amnesty 
law. See id. This document is a listing of positions taken by the conference and policy arguments 
which the conference agreed will bring effective, lasting peace to Guatemala. See generally HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS, AMNESTY CONFERENCE IN GUATEMALA, MEMORANDUM OF CONFER-
ENCE (1995) [hereinafter AMNESTY CONFERENCE]. 
196 DE LEON CARPIO REpORT, supra note 185, at 9. 
197 See O'Kane, supra note 6, at 1. 
198 See Edward Orlebar, Guatemala Rights Agreement Fails to Take Root, FIN. TIMES, July 29, 
1994, at 1. 
199 See O'Kane, supra note 6, at 1. 
200 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS, GUATEMALA: RETURN TO VIOLENCE, REFUGEES, 
CIVIL PATROLLERS, AND IMPUNITY 2 (1996) [hereinafter RETURN TO VIOLENCE]. 
201 Id. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 See id. 
205 Id. 
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B. The Proposed Guatemalan Commission 
The establishment of a truth commission was the largest obstacle 
in the peace talks.206 The initial round of talks was stalled because the 
URNG insisted on a commission while the military had strong objec-
tions.207 This impasse was not broken until the URNG accepted that 
the truth commission issue be set aside for later deliberation.208 The 
initial agreement does not mention a truth commission.209 As is typical 
of military regimes, the Army argued that a truth commission "would 
direct its attention only towards the security forces, disregarding abuses 
committed by the guerrillas, and ... it would 'polarize' public opinion 
instead of aiding in reconciliation. "210 
InJune 1994, the parties signed an agreement establishing a truth 
commission and defining its terms.211 The agreement provided that the 
Commission will: 
l.investigate the estimated 100,000 deaths and 40,000 dis-
appearances that occurred from the beginning of the armed 
conflict to the signing of the final accord;212 
2. begin operating immediately after the final accord is 
signed; 
3. only identifY institutions, not individuals, which are re-
sponsible for human rights violations; 
4. operate for up to one year; and 
206 See Trish O'Kane, Truth Panel Will Shake Up Military, S.F. CHRON., july 4, 1994, at 1 
[hereinafter Panel Will Shake]. 
207 See id. 
208 See Calendar Agreed for Peace Process; URNG Accepts Separate Deal on 'Truth Commission, ' 
LATIN AM. WKLY. REp., Apr. 21, 1994, at 159. 
209 See id. 
210 Talks to Await Geneva 'Battle:' Reports of Coup-Mongering Persist Despite Denials, LATIN AM. 
WKLY. REp., Feb. 24, 1994, at 2. A question that arises here is why the military changed its position 
on the truth commission so suddenly. See id. Commentators cite three reasons: (1) the commis-
sion is not terribly threatening because it has no legal power and will not single out individuals; 
(2) the military personnel is slowly changing-a "modernizing faction" is ascending in the ranks 
of the armed forces which is looking to the future and is not responsible for the abuses; therefore, 
they can blame those who came before; and (3) there was strong international pressure to move 
forward with the talks. See id. 
211 See Greg Mcivor, Norway-Guatemala: Agreement Reached on Human Rights Commission, 
INTER PRESS SERVICE, june 23,1994, at 1-2. 
212 Stephen Baranyi et aI., Ouatemala at the Crossroads, JUNE'S INTELLIGENCE REv., Oct. 1, 
1995, at 17. The armed conflict is said to have started in 1960, making the period of investigation 
approximately 36 years. See Panel Will Shake, supra note 206, at 1. 
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5. consist of three members, one of which will be appointed 
by Secretary General of the United Nations.213 
Mter the signing of the agreement, Rodrigo Asturias, the leader 
of the URNG delegation at the talks, said, 'We have for the first time 
been granted the right to know the truth. That is the most important 
step in order to put an end to the abuse. "214 Human rights activists, 
however, were disappointed with the agreement's compromise of not 
naming individuals.215 Rigoberta Menchu, a Guatemalan indigenous 
rights activist, criticized the Commission as being merely symbolic 
because "it falls short of naming individuals responsible for abuses and 
will not provide a moral sanction. "216 A representative of the families 
of those who have disappeared accused the military of fooling the 
international community with "double talk" while "inside the country 
they still use threats and violence, and they do not respect the law."217 
Although the accord establishing the Truth Commission was signed 
in 1994, human rights organizations did not settle for the shortcomings 
of the proposed Commission.218 They scheduled a nongovernmental 
organization conference for December, 1996 for the purpose of dis-
cussing expansion of the Commission's mandate, including possibly 
granting the Commission the authority to name names.219 In addition 
to the issues regarding the mandate, a number of other issues sur-
rounding the Truth Commission were scheduled to be resolved, in-
cluding issues which are common to truth commissions in general and 
issues which should be viewed in light of the proximate Salvadoran 
experience. 
213 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations 
and Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, U.N. GASC, 48th Sess., 
Agenda Item 40, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/48/954/ Annex II (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on the 
Establishment]. 
214 Panel Will Shake, supra note 206, at l. 
215 See Orlebar, supra note 198, at 3. 
216Id. at 2. A leader of the Widows' council said, "We are not pleased with the truth 
commission agreement. We want the first and last names of those responsible for the violence." 
Panel Will Shake, supra note 206, at 4. 
217 Panel Will Shake, supra note 206, at 4. 
218 See Telephone Interview with Gretta Tovar, Human Rights Watch/Americas Guatemala 
Expert (Nov. 5, 1996). 
219 See id. 
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V. ISSUES SURROUNDING TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
A. The Commission's Mandate 
A fundamental issue that is determined during the formative 
stages of a truth commission is defining the commission's mandate or 
terms of reference. The terms of reference of a commission are usually 
set forth in the agreement establishing the commission.220 By "terms 
of reference," commentators usually mean the commission's mission 
statement or mandate.221 Basically, the terms of reference answer the 
question of what the commission is established to investigate.222 Truth 
commissions primarily investigate human rights abuses, but their man-
dates often restrict their investigations to certain types of abuses or 
even to particular instances of abuse. For instance, an Uruguayan 
Commission was limited to investigating illegal detention and torture 
and a Chilean Commission was limited to investigating disappearances, 
executions, and torture leading to death. 223 Those abuses which were 
not fatal were not reported.224 
Commentators suggest that the terms of reference be "sufficiently 
broad to allow investigation into all forms of rights abuses"225 because a 
flexible, broad mandate allows a more complete picture of the truth.226 
The Salvadoran Commission provides an example of an effective man-
date.227 The agreement forging the Salvadoran Commission provided 
the general guideline that "the commission should report on serious 
acts of violence ... whose impact on society urgently demands that the 
public should know the truth. "228 
Before agreeing to this broad mandate, the parties unsuccessfully 
attempted to negotiate a more specific mandate. 229 Each party submit-
ted a list of cases for the Commission to investigate.23o Mter failing to 
agree on a list of cases, the parties accepted the compromise suggested 
220 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 636. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. at 637. 
224 See id. 
225 Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 636. 
226 See id. at 637. 
227 See id. 
228Id. 
229 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 7; see also Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 637. 
230 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 7. 
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by the United Nations, which was to let the Commission decide which 
cases to investigate.231 This allowed the Commission great latitude in 
carrying out investigations.232 Consequently, the Commission formu-
lated a report that provided representative cases which in turn com-
posed a representative picture of the period investigated.233 
Although the Salvadoran Commission's mandate was broad in that 
it allowed the Commission to choose which cases to investigate, it 
nevertheless suffered from inadequacies.234 The Commission's empha-
sis on "serious acts of violence" led it to focus on two types of cases: 
those which "outraged Salvadoran society and/or international opin-
ion" and those which were representative of a systematic pattern of 
violence.235 By focusing on numerous high profile cases, the Commis-
sion "[d]evoted much of its time to cases in which responsibility had 
already been established. "236 The issue of who committed these acts was 
not generally disputed. Therefore, the Commission spent much of its 
time investigating and reporting on a truth that was already known, 
thereby producing what some would call a narrow and incomplete 
truth that did not serve those most profoundly affected by the vio-
lence.237 
Margaret L. Popkin, a human rights attorney and proponent of 
victim-centered truth, explains that these shortcomings of the Commis-
sion and its mandate reflect their sources, which were political nego-
tiations. 238 Political negotiations tend to serve only those who are rep-
resented. 239 The Salvadoran negotiations failed to effectively represent 
large sectors of Salvadorans affected by the violence. 24o As a result, the 
Commission produced a report that represented the interests at the 
231 See id. 
232 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 637. 
233 See id. 
234 See Margaret L. Popkin, Judicial Reform in Post-War El Salvador: Missed Opportunities, 
Address at the 1995 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association 5 (Sept. 28-30, 1995) 
(transcript available from Margaret L. Popkin, at Robert F. Kennedy Memorial for Human 
Rights). 
235 See FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 149, at 19. 
236 Popkin, supra note 234, at 5. 
237 See id. at 4-5. More specifically, Popkin criticizes the Commission for reporting on a 
disproportionate number of cases involving foreign nationals-one-fourth of the 32 cases inves-
tigated. See id. at 5. Furthermore, the Commission, given its emphasis on representative cases, 
failed to pursue most statements it received, to assess the effects of the violence on survivors, and 
to suggest such follow-up be undertaken. See id. 
238 See id. at 4. 
239 See id. at 4-5. 
240 See id. 
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negotiating table, a report that neglected large portions of Salvadoran 
society.241 
Popkin comments that other investigatory commissions have had 
a more holistic focus.242 Such commissions attempt to bring various 
viewpoints together, write an official history, provide an official forum 
for victims to speak, establish accountability, and develop mechanisms 
for compensation.243 Imperative to meeting these goals is a concern for 
the rights of the victims and for the establishment of ongoing mecha-
nisms for truth.244 In EI Salvador neither of the parties were focused 
on these concerns.245 The FMLN's goal seemed to be vengeance, given 
its emphasis on military impunity and prosecution of exemplary cases.246 
The government's goal seemed to be trifold: to avoid the past if possi-
ble, to avoid responsibility, and to quickly move on.247 
Like the Salvadoran Commission, the Guatemalan Commission is 
also a product of political negotiations in which no party truly or 
completely represented the victims of the violence. Therefore, given 
the similarity to the Salvadoran experience, the Guatemalan Commis-
sion should take precautions against investigating only notorious cases 
which are generally not in dispute. The Guatemalan mandate directs 
the Commission to "clarifY fully and in detail cases of human rights 
violations. "248 This mandate is sufficiently broad to provide the Guate-
malan Commission with flexibility to implement its mandate so as to 
report a complete truth which serves the victims. It does not include 
limiting language like "serious acts of violence," as did the Salvadoran 
mandate. The Guatemalan Commission, however, must now actualize 
this potential and not limit itself. In EI Salvador, the Commission's 
mandate did not necessarily force it to focus on notorious acts, but the 
Commission's own interpretation of the mandate led it to such a 
narrow result. 
B. Investigation of International Actors 
An important question that arises in determining the mandate of 
a truth commission is whether to investigate or consider the role of 
241 See Popkin, supra note 234, at 4-5. 
242 See id. 
243 See id. at 4. 
244 See id. at 4-5. 
245 See id. at 4. 
246 See Popkin, supra note 234, at 5. 
247 See id. 
248 AMNESTY CONFERENCE, supra note 195, at 1. 
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international actors.249 Most cases of civil strife involve international 
actors, "usually foreign governments-that helped to fund, arm, train 
or otherwise aid and assist either or both sides of the conflict."250 Some 
commentators argue that in such circumstances a truth commission 
which does not address the involvement of foreign governments fails 
to paint a picture of the truth. 251 Nevertheless, time limitations and the 
commission's primary objective must be considered when making this 
decision.252 
The Salvadoran Commission only generally addressed the role of 
foreign actors when it described "how the United States government 
tolerated and apparently paid little heed to" a group of Salvadoran 
exiles in Miami who contributed financially to the death squads.253 The 
report, however, did suggest that further investigation into this case 
should be carried out to prevent such tolerance by the United States 
in the future. 254 
In justifying the choice not to investigate foreign involvement, 
Commissioner Thomas Buergenthal stated that the Salvadoran Com-
mission "would not have been able to fulfill its main mission: clarifying 
the circumstances and extent of the violence in the country. "255 There-
fore, the Commission's time constraints would have prevented it from 
both meeting its primary objective and sufficiently investigating inter-
national involvement. 
An Americas Watch Conference on the peace process in Guate-
mala concluded that the Guatemalan Truth Commission "should take 
into account" international forces "behind the mechanism ofviolence."256 
This does not imply that the Commission should necessarily come to 
specific conclusions or conduct a complete investigation of interna-
tional actors, however, it does suggest that the Commission address 
these issues in some manner. Failure to address the role of interna-
tional actors in some manner would be such a deliberate avoidance of 
an important, contentious, and widely recognized issue that the Gua-
temalan Commission's credibility in general would be called into ques-
tion. 
249 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 637. 
250Id. 
251 See id. at 637 n.96. 
252 See id. at 638-39. 
253 See id. at 638. 
254 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 638. 
255 Id. at 638-39. 
256 AMNESTY CONFERENCE, supra note 195, at 2. 
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The Commission's recognition of international actors is especially 
important in Guatemala because the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) has historically supported the Guatemalan military. This 
relationship has become common knowledge due to a number of 
high-profile incidents in Guatemala involving United States citizens.257 
Indeed, a Presidential investigative board reported that the CIA paid 
informants in Guatemala who "ordered, planned, or participated in 
serious human rights violations .... "258 As this relationship between 
international actors and the Guatemalan military becomes firmly rec-
ognized, the Truth Commission must address this relationship in some 
manner. Otherwise, such apparent avoidance will leave the truth in-
complete and raise doubt about the report's veracity. 
C. Public Involvement 
Another issue that has been raised is whether to engage the public 
in debate regarding the Commission. Human rights advocates support 
public involvement in crafting investigative commissions. Jose Zalaquett, 
a member of the Chilean Commission, calls for a public referendum 
or, at least, a body of popularly elected officials which approves the 
creation of a commission.259 Human Rights Watch agrees, stating that 
"[t]he will of the majority is of course important to consider when it 
comes to strategy choices, such as whether to conduct ... [an] inves-
tigation into the truth of abuses. "260 In criticizing the Salvadoran Com-
mission, Margaret Popkin concurs that "the degree of truth and justice 
257 See CIA Hired Alleged Killers in Guatemala llut U.S. Rep(fft Can't Link It to Murders of U. S. 
Citizens, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), june 29, 1996, at lA [hereinafter CIA HirerIJ; Laura 
Myers, U.S.: Guatemala Hid Alluse of Americans, Papers Released on Innkeeper; Harbury Case, 
SEATTLE TIMES, May 7, 1996, at All; Larry Rohter, U.S. Files Shed Little Light on Alluses in 
Guatemala; Human Rights Case Investigat(ffs Say CIA, State Department Still Not F(ffthcoming, 
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 11, 1996, at A27; Tim Weiner, Guatemalan Hierarchy Linked to 
Killing Paid to Keep Mum, U.S. Officials Say, ST.J.-REG. (Springfield, IL), Mar. 24,1996, at 7. The 
high-profile cases referred to are the killing of Michael Devine, a U.S. citizen and inn-keeper in 
Guatemala; the torture and killing of Efrain Bamaca, a guerrilla commander married to a U.S. 
citizen; and the torture of Diana Ortiz, a United States citizen and Ursiline nun who was teaching 
in Guatemala. See CIA Hired, supra, at lA; Myers, supra, at All. Colonel julio Roberto Alpirez, a 
Guatemalan Military Officer who was on the CIA pay roll, has been found to be involved in the 
cover-up of two of these cases. See Robert Cohen, Administration Is Prodded on Guatemala 
Rape-T(ffture of Nun, Sister Ortiz Continues Fast as T(ffTjcelli Demands Inf(ffmation from White House 
on Possible U.S. Role, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, JIij), May 3,1996, at 10. However, involved individuals 
are not satisfied with this finding and they are pressuring the United States Government for 
further disclosure of classified documents. See id. 
258 Peter Zirnite, U.S.-Guatemala: Victims Say Study on CIA Ties to Alluses Inadequate, INTER 
PRESS SERVICE,july 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10767935. 
259 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at {i39. 
260Id. at 640. 
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to be attained, are issues that require the involvement of those affected 
and should not be determined solely by political negotiations. "261 
Typically, a direct public role in formulating a truth commission 
may seem logistically impossible, given time constraints and a fragile 
political environment. However, this is not the case in Guatemala.262 In 
fact, Guatemala provides a good opportunity to submit the Commis-
sion to public debate. Time has yet to be a factor, as the Commission's 
findings are overdue.263 The accord stipulates that the Commission can 
run for as long as one year.264 This provides sufficient time for public 
participation, either informally in the news media, or possibly formally 
by referendum. Furthermore, the 1995 presidential election evinces 
the Guatemalan Government's capacity to sustain a vote politically and 
logistically.265 
D. Staff Composition 
Another important question that every truth commission faces is 
whether the commission should be comprised of nationals or interna-
tionals.266 This question raises issues of national sovereignty and neu-
trality.267 An international commission may be more neutral in "a highly 
polarized environment. "268 This perceived or actual neutrality yields 
greater legitimacy.269 Furthermore, in such a polarized and defensive 
atmosphere, greater international pressure will encourage the parties 
to cooperate with the commission and follow through with its recom-
mendations.27o Finally, internationals will be less likely to avoid sensitive 
issues or powerful figures out of intimidation or fear for their own 
261 Popkin, supra note 234, at 4. Popkin blames the failure of the peace process to include 
those affected by the violence for the Commission's narrow investigation, which only served the 
interests of the government and the FMLN. See id. 
262 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 640. 
263 See Greg McIvor, Guatemala: Agreement Reached on Human Rights Commission, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, June 23, 1994, at l. 
264 See id. 
265 See Larry Hufford, A Victory for Guatemala's Indigenous Population, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Dec. 3, 1995, at lL. For public debate to be effective, however, it must truly be public and 
popular, representing the will of the people. See id. Otherwise, a referendum tainted with military 
intimidation or ballot stuffing would serve only those who benefit from a hidden past. See id. 
266 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 641-43. 
267 See id. at 642-43. 
268 Id. at 642. 
269 See id. 
270 See id. 
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well-being. 271 Therefore, the report they produce is likely to be more 
probing, telling, and accurate. 272 
Although staffing a commission with internationals creates several 
benefits, there are a number of counterpoints that must be consid-
ered.273 First, an international commission may be rejected based on 
national sovereignty concerns.274 No matter how objective the report 
or the investigation, if the predominant mood in the country is anti-
international and anti-intervention, the report will not be effectively 
embraced.275 Second, the international commission, by virtue of its 
foreignness, may lack familiarity with cultural and political nuances 
within the country.276 This may limit the investigation or even cause the 
commission to inadvertently neglect certain important issues.277 
The Salvadoran Commission was successful in part because it was 
staffed completely by internationals. This aided the Commission in 
practical matters. When the Salvadoran Government was not forthcom-
ing with much-needed information, the Commission was able to solicit 
international sources. For instance, Commissioner Thomas Buergen-
thaI, a United States citizen, was given limited security clearance by the 
United States Department of State, which allowed him to examine 
relevant files from a number of United States Government agencies.278 
Furthermore, the Commission named powerful government and mili-
tary officials which Salvadoran Commissioners may have prudently 
avoided out of fear for their lives. 279 In sum, the Commission carried 
out a thorough, well-respected investigation in large part because they 
were free from intimidation and coercion which may have hushed a 
commission of Salvadoran nationals. 280 
By the terms of the initial accord, the Guatemalan Commission is 
staffed by one international Commissioner and two Guatemalan Com-
missioners as set forth in the initial accord.281 Given the history in 
271 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 642-43. 
272 See id. 
273 See id. at 643. 
274 See id. 
275 See id. 
276 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 643. 
277 See id. 
278 See BuergenthaI, supra note 23, at 508. Nevertheless, this security clearance was limited 
and the State Department created a number of obstacles that put certain information beyond 
reach. See id. 
279 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 642-43. 
280 See id. 
281 See Agreement on the Establishment, supra note 213, at 13. 
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Guatemala of intimidation, harassment, and assassination of human 
rights activists, however, the Commission should be completely inter-
national. By including nationals, the Commission is risking failure. 
This risk was exemplified a decade ago when a Commission established 
by the Guatemalan government in 1986 disbarred itself precisely due 
to violence against its members.282 
The Committee on International Human Rights for the Bar Asso-
ciation of New York City published a report in 1993 documenting three 
cases of high profile human rights activists who suffered intimidation, 
torture, and even death at the hands of the military.283 Those activists 
who survived only did so due to intense international attention and 
actual accompaniment by human rights officials. This protection, how-
ever, occurred only after the activists had been severely abused and 
tortured.284 In light of this history, the Guatemalan Commissioners will 
face unprecedented risk because Guatemala has never undergone an 
investigation with such grave consequences for the military. 
On the other hand, an exclusively international commission is 
protected from such grave risk in part because the commissioners are 
not forced to live under the rule of those they investigate. Instead, they 
would leave Guatemala after the duration of the Commission. Never-
theless, this transience that offers protection also has disadvantages. 
Margaret L. Popkin argues that commissions should help initiate on-
going societal processes and encourage existing institutions to fulfill 
their obligations. This is difficult for an international commission 
because after the duration of the commission, international commis-
sioners and staffers leave the country. Without their support, presence, 
and help, reformers may have difficulty carrying out the recommen-
dations and establishing ongoing mechanisms. An international com-
mission can pre-empt these shortcomings with strong and specific 
recommendations for reform around which national reformers can 
lobby. Then it can encourage the reform and protect the reformers by 
strongly recommending a follow-up commission. The follow-up com-
mission would assess the degree to which the country has succeeded 
in instituting reforms. Although this suggestion may not be as effective 
as a national commission in establishing sustainable human rights 
2H2 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA; THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 10-12 (1987) 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD]. 
2H3 SeeThe Committee on International Human Rights, Human Rights and the Administration 
of Justice in Guatemala, 48 REc. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 673, 673 (Oct. 1993) [hereinafter BAR OF NYC]. 
284 See id. at 687-707. 
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protection, it may be a necessary compromise when faced with the 
alternative risks. 285 
E. Naming Names in the Commission Report 
Among the most contentious issues that a commission must face 
is whether to name names in the commission report. 286 On one side of 
the debate, those against naming names argue that due process re-
quires that individuals receive fair treatment and be allowed to defend 
themselves, which means that the accused individuals must be allowed 
to face their accusers before being pronounced guilty.287 Additionally, 
they maintain that due process is violated if a commission report names 
individuals responsible for certain crimes without providing the ac-
cused individuals the panoply of due process protections.288 Therefore, 
in order to guarantee due process, no names should be named. 
Meanwhile, those in favor of including names compellingly argue 
that "[t]elling the full truth requires naming persons responsible for 
human rights crimes when there is absolute evidence of their culpabil-
ity. "289 They assert that naming names is required as part of the truth, 
especially when it is unlikely that they will be prosecuted formally in a 
court of law.290 Furthermore, they urge that it must be kept in mind 
that the Commission report is not a conviction, as the named individu-
als will not suffer state sanctioned, formal punishment. Therefore, 
those in favor of naming names conclude that high standards of due 
process are not required.291 
Contrary to the demands of the government, the Salvadoran Com-
mission did name names. 292 For this it has been praised as providing a 
complete picture of the truth. 293 The Commission required that before 
naming individuals, those individuals would have an opportunity to 
confront the evidence, but not the actual witness, against them.294 
285 See id. 
286 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 647. 
287 See id. at 647-48. 
288 See id. 
289Id. at 648. 
290 See id. 
291 See id. 
292 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 12. 
293 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 628. 
294 See Peace Process Hearings, supra note 115, at 14 (testimony of Belisario Betancur, President 
of Truth Commission). 
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By the initial treaty, the Guatemalan Commission is not to name 
individuals responsible for crimes.295 This silence is a result of intense 
international pressure on the URNG to surrender its demand for 
names.296 The reaction from human rights activists and victims to this 
compromise has been severe. Many have claimed that avoiding names 
is not a complete, satisfying, or effective truth.297 
The Human Rights Watch Amnesty Conference concluded that 
individuals should be identified in the Commission report.298 The Con-
ference reconciled the dilemma between a complete truth and due 
process rights by recommending that names should be included "when-
ever possible" and that a process guaranteeing the rights of the accused 
should be established.299 The Conference addressed the obvious con-
tention that under the treaty, the Commission was not to name indi-
viduals. The Conference determined that the treaty was ambiguous in 
that it was internally inconsistent. Particularly, the Commission's man-
date "to clarify fully and in detail" contradicted the provision in the 
accord prohibiting the Commission from individualizing responsibil-
ity.300 Therefore, the Conference implicitly argued that the Commission 
was free to resolve the ambiguity on the side of naming names. 301 
Furthermore, considering Guatemala's history, a report that iden-
tifies institutions but not individuals is likely to make reform superficial 
and ineffective. In 1982, a military junta under General Efrain Rios 
Montt carried out what was called a "restructuring" of a security unit 
suspected of serious human rights violations.302 In that situation, the 
Government and the Truth Commission blamed an institution which 
the Government subsequently attempted to reform. However, a former 
security agent testified to Amnesty International that as a result of the 
attempted reform, "only the names of the agencies [were] changed 
[but] the personnel and their working methods remained essentially 
the same. "303 It follows that the Guatemalan Government will be able 
to meet the recommendations in the Truth Commission report by 
295 See Agreement on the Establishment, supra note 213, at 13. 'The work, recommendations 
and report of the Commission shall not individualize responsibilities, nor shall they have judicial 
objectives or consequences." Id. 
296 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note I, at 644-46. 
297 See id. 
298 See AMNESTY CONFERENCE, supra note 195, at 3. 
299 See id. 
300 See id. at 2. 
301 See id. 
302 See id. at 54-55. 
303 AMNESTY CONFERENCE, supra note 195, at 54-55. 
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merely changing the names and organizational structure of its institu-
tions. 304 This will amount to nothing more than the old military and 
Government under new titles. 305 
F. Confidentiality of the Investigation 
This issue of whether the investigation should be public or confiden-
tial breaks down into specific questions that address different compo-
nents of the investigation. Should the identities of those who come 
forward be kept confidential? Should those accused have the right to 
cross-examine witnesses? Should the interviews be carried out in pub-
lic?306 These important questions raise difficult issues of due process, 
fairness, credibility, and neutrality.307 If confidentiality is guaranteed to 
witnesses, then more individuals would be likely to testifY because they 
will not be risking their personal well-being by coming forward.308 If 
the witnesses' identities are not revealed, however, then the accused 
are denied the opportunity to completely face the evidence against 
them. This situation would preclude cross-examination.309 Such a limi-
tation may call the report's credibility into question, thereby jeopard-
izing its effectiveness. Given such a dilemma, the commission must 
ensure fairness in its process, precision in its investigation, and objec-
tivity in its analysis in order to both protect the witnesses and preserve 
the effectiveness of its findings. 310 
The Salvadoran Commission was able to ensure fairness, preci-
sion, and objectivity. The Commission "sustained the highest level of 
confidentiality" to protect witnesses from harassment while maintain-
ing a high standard of due process to protect the accused. 311 It did not 
name an individual unless the Commission met a high standard of 
proof and the individual had an opportunity to face the evidence.312 
Furthermore, the Commission's international composition protected 
it against suspicions of bias.313 
304 See HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 282, at 55. 
305 See id. 
306 See Fifteen Commissions. supra note 1, at 647. 
307 See id. 
308 See id. 
309 See Peace Process Hearings, supra note 115, at 14 (testimony of Belisario Betancur, President 
of Truth Commission). 
310 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 647. 
311 See id.; ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 12. 
312 See Peace Process Hearings, supra note 115, at 10 (testimony of Belisario Betancur, President 
of Truth Commission). 
313 See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text. 
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The Guatemalan Commission will also face this dilemma. Protect-
ing those who testifY is especially important considering that the mili-
tary has a history of intimidation and harassment and is still established 
in rural communities.314 The Guatemalan Commission must ensure the 
highest level of confidentiality to witnesses, otherwise few will come 
forward, and those who do will face grave repercussions. However, 
confidentiality raises difficulties with credibility and fairness. Given the 
domestic composition of the Commission, the report may be discred-
ited for bias. Even the Salvadoran Commission, an international com-
mission, was accused of being one-sided and its findings were sub-
sequently rejected by the Government.315 
To ensure that the Government does not reject the final report 
and to guarantee the safety of the witnesses, the Guatemalan Commis-
sion must institute procedures that are at once confidential, objective, 
and fair. In this regard, the Salvadoran Commission is an effective 
model. The Salvadoran Commission very successfully carried out an 
investigation that ensured safety to the witnesses, evinced by the large 
numbers that came forward, while maximizing due process rights for 
the accused. 
As mentioned above, notwithstanding such standards of fairness 
and objectivity, the Salvadoran Government did not hesitate to reject 
the report. The Commission was not successful in preventing that 
rejection. Merely five days after the release of the report, the Govern-
ment issued an amnesty protecting from prosecution anyone identified 
in the report. The Guatemalan Commission, while emulating the Sal-
vadoran lessons of confidentiality and objectivity, should act to prevent 
such a rejection by the Guatemalan Government. 
VI. AMNESTY 
A. Amnesties and the Peace Process in General 
There is a growing consensus that past human rights abuses can-
not go ignored in a transition to democracy.316 Yet, governments in 
transition can acknowledge past abuses to varying degrees.317 A new 
314 See generally BAR OF NYC, supra note 283. 
315 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 20-23. 
316 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 4; Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 598-600. 
"Without the establishment of the rule of law, there is no hope that any president-no matter 
how well intentioned-will be able to make democracy succeed in Guatemala." BAR OF NYC, 
supra note 283, at 708. 
317 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 4. 
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government can choose to completely ignore and deny past abuses by 
granting a blanket amnesty, seek truth, or seekjustice.318 Some human 
rights experts believe that both truth and justice are necessary to end 
human rights abuses, establish the rule of law, and ultimately install 
lasting democracy.319 
States in transition to democracy are increasingly accepting the 
importance of truth in the process of reconciliation.32o This growing 
acceptance is reflected by the increasing use of truth commissions.321 
Nevertheless, truth commissions are merely one step in overcoming a 
long silenced past.322 They bring the past to light, but they are not 
tantamount to "formal legal accountability through the prosecution of 
individuals. "323 This justice stage of formal accountability must not be 
avoided by states attempting to end human rights abuses and establish 
democracy.324 
Although truth commissions do not sufficiently satisfy the justice 
phase of peacemaking, they can help in the transition to this phase.325 
Often the justice phase is stifled by the granting of a blanket am-
nesty after commission reports are issued.326 For example, the amnesty 
passed following the Salvadoran report is regarded as the Govern-
ment's complete rejection of the report. 327 Although the report was 
heralded for its effectiveness, the Government stifled its potential suc-
cess by avoiding complete acknowledgment via the amnesty.328 In an-
ticipation of a similar reaction from the Guatemalan Government, the 
Guatemalan Commission, in order to maximize its efficacy, should 
318 See id. at 4-5. 
319 See AMNESTY CONFERENCE, supra note 195, at 1. 
320 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 3. 
321 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 598 (supporting increasing use of truth commis-
sions). 
322 See id. at 604-05. 
323 Id. at 604. 
324 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
325 See id. at 4. But see Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 605 (contending that whether to 
prosecute is a political decision in which the truth commission should not interfere). 
Id. 
326 See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 23. 
327 See id. 
In enacting another amnesty so close on the heels of the Truth Commission report, 
however, the ruling ARENA party and its supporters in the Assembly seemed 
deliberately to want to undercut the report. Vice-president of the Assembly and 
opposition leader Ruben Zamora ... charged that [the amnesty] "open[ed] the 
doors for the government to escape fulfillment of the Truth Commission's recom-
mendations. " 
328 See Fifteen Commissions, supra note 1, at 607, 629 (discussing importance of acknow-
ledgment and discussing rejection, amnesty, and military report). 
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strongly recommend against a blanket amnesty. There are legal and 
policy arguments supporting this position in the Guatemalan peace 
accords, Guatemalan history, and international law. 
B. Arguments Against Granting an Amnesty in Guatemala 
1. The Peace Accords 
In the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, the Guate-
malan Government made a measured commitment to end impunity. 
In Section 3, Paragraph 1, the Government agreed not to propose 
legislation designed to interfere with the prosecution of human rights 
violators. 329 The Government made a further promise to sponsor legis-
lation criminalizing involuntary disappearance and extrajudicial exe-
cutions.33o Paragraph 3 of that section explicitly barred any special law 
invoked to uphold impunity in respect to human rights violations. 331 
Although these provisions seem to completely prohibit an amnesty 
law, they leave room for legislative action protecting past human rights 
violators. Paragraph 1 is merely a negative duty binding the "govern-
ment."332 "Government" here may be read to include only the execu-
tive. Therefore, this paragraph only prohibits the president from "spon-
soring" an amnesty law. Under this provision, the legislature is still free 
to grant an amnesty as long as it is not initiated by the president.333 
Paragraph 3 is somewhat more comprehensive than Paragraph 1 
in prohibiting the protection of human rights violators, as it provides 
that no such law shall be passed.334 This language can be read to 
include both the executive and the legislature.335 Whether Paragraph 
3 applies to amnesties protecting past human rights abusers, however, 
is questionable. The Paragraph prohibits any law which would "uphold 
impunity in respect of human rights violations."336 "Uphold [ing] impu-
329 See Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights I Guatemala, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., at sec. 
3, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/48/49/ Add. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Comprehensive Agreementl. 
330 See id. at sec. 3, para. 2. 
331 See id. at sec. 3, para. 3. 
332 See id. at sec. 3, para. 1. 
333 See id. In the alternative, if "government" is read to include the executive as well, the 
provision still leaves room for an amnesty. See id. The provision only bars the government from 
"proposing" an amnesty. See id. It does not bar the government from "passing" one. See id. 
Therefore, the spirit of the provision can be easily circumvented by a government with the 
political will. See id. 
334 See Comprehensive Agreement, supra note 329, at sec. 3, para. 3. 
335 See id. 
336Id. at sec. 3, para. 3. 
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nity" may be read to suggest that no law can be granted which would 
contribute to continued impunity. Under this reading, the legislature 
is still free to pass an amnesty protecting those who have committed 
human rights violations in the past. By passing a blanket amnesty law, 
the legislature would not violate Paragraph 3 because its legislation 
would only affect past impunity rather than upholding continued im-
punity. 
Although the commitment against impunity is somewhat deficient 
because of these ambiguities, the Truth Commission can clarifY the 
ambiguities and thereby hold the Government, including the legisla-
ture, to the spirit of its commitment. In its recommendations, the 
Truth Commission can emphasize the importance of prosecutions, and 
furthermore, explicitly denounce an amnesty for past human rights 
abuses.337 As a result, the legislature could not pass an amnesty which 
would allow the Government to stifle the peace process by avoiding 
acknowledgment of past human rights violations while holding out to 
the international community an appearance of cooperation and com-
pliance with the peace accords. 
2. Guatemala's Amnesty History 
Given Guatemala's amnesty history, the Government is particu-
larly likely to attempt to avoid acknowledgment by issuing an amnesty 
law. Based on this likelihood, the Commission should be especially 
vigilant and should take affirmative measures to block a blanket am-
nesty. 
In recent history, a number of amnesty laws have been issued by 
various Guatemalan regimes.338 These amnesties generally were con-
structed for the benefit of the Government rather than for 
some broader salutary societal effect.339 For example, one amnesty was 
granted after the international pressure of the Arias peace plan.340 In 
the peace plan, the purpose of the amnesty was to open up political 
space for opposition groups to join political life.341 On October 28, 
337 See Popkin, supra note 234, at 6-7. 
338 See HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 282, at 10-12; CLOSING THE SPACE, supra note 
180, at 103-04. 
339 See CLOSING THE SPACE, supra note 180, at 103-04. 
340 See id. The Arias peace plan (formally called the Central American Peace Plan) was signed 
by five Central American heads of state in Guatemala City in August 1987. See id. at 101. Among 
the concerns called for were respect for human rights, complete freedom of the press, democra-
tization, and urgent attention to the needs of refugees and displaced persons. See id. 
341 See id. at 103 n.1l8. 
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1987, the Guatemalan National Assembly passed a law granting am-
nesty to civilians who would turn over their weapons to the Govern-
ment.342 
Given the volatile human rights climate and the continuing civil 
war, this amnesty was suspicious. Because those who came forward 
would be incriminating themselves as subversives in the context of a 
civil war, they could hardly be guaranteed protection from military 
reprisals.343 Additionally, since no peace settlement had been reached, 
the amnesty seemed to be merely a strategic attempt to reduce the 
ranks of the rebel forces without conciliation from the Government. 
Not surprisingly, very few individuals voluntarily came forward. 
Nevertheless, the Government reported that thousands accepted am-
nesty.344 To achieve these high numbers, the military entered the rural 
highlands and forced peasants to accept the amnesty.345 In June 1988, 
the Government exploited the amnesty further by extending it to 
civilians and the military personnel who were involved in the May 11, 
1988 coup attempt.346 Therefore, the Government not only used the 
amnesty to exploit civilian highlanders, but also to protect its own 
agents from prosecution. 
Another earlier amnesty was granted in 1982 after the coup led 
by General Efrain Rios Montt. 347 Montt offered freedom from prosecu-
tion to any guerrillas who would come forward and "lay down their 
arms. "348 Newspapers reported that large numbers of "subversives" turned 
themselves in.349 However, Amnesty International spoke with "other 
sources" that suggested that the Government tortured suspected sub-
342 See id. at 103. 
343 See id. supra note 180, at 104. In fact. the statute did not even attempt to protect those 
who came forward. The Guatemalan Bar Association criticized the law for not guaranteeing 
freedom and security to those who came forward. See id. 
344 See CLOSING THE SPACE. supra note 180, at 104. 
345 See id. 
346 See id. 
347 See HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. supra note 282. at 54. This amnesty and the 1986 amnesty. 
discussed immediately below. were promulgated by the Executive with approval by the Cabinet. 
See id. at 10 n.l. The process was legitimized by the Fundamental Statute of Government which 
was instituted by the military coup in 1982. See id. This statute governed the law-making process 
until the popular election of President Cerezo in 1986. See id. President Cerezo governed under 
a new constitution which granted the law-making power to the Congress. See id. 
348 Id. 
349 See id. 
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versives until they agreed to admit to the press that they had voluntarily 
accepted the amnesty.350 
In 1986, yet another amnesty was promulgated only four days 
before the popularly elected president Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo came to 
power.351 This amnesty barred the initiation of prosecution against 
perpetrators of political crimes which occurred between 1982 and 
1986.352 Amnesty International concluded that this amnesty, like the 
others, was "clearly intended to prevent the prosecution of military 
personnel for human rights abuses. "353 Mter a Supreme Court investi-
gation which implicated those responsible for numerous instances of 
secret torture and detention, President Cerezo contended that he 
could not prosecute the perpetrators because the amnesty prevented 
him from doing SO.354 
The events surrounding the 1986 amnesty provide yet another 
example of the Guatemalan Government's tendency to manipulate 
amnesty laws to serve its own political ends. The amnesty did not 
categorically bar President Cerezo from prosecuting those identified 
in the Supreme Court investigation. Additionally, the Guatemalan Con-
stitution provides that acts promulgated by military regimes can be 
annulled by Congress. Because the amnesty was promulgated by a 
military regime, it could have been annulled, thereby allowing the 
president to prosecute.355 
These prior amnesties suggest a number of things for Guatemala's 
future. It is very likely that the Government will continue to grant 
amnesties without hesitation, despite its promises in the Human Rights 
Accord. A future amnesty probably would not promote reconciliation, 
as the military now suggests. Rather, an amnesty likely would be used 
as a political tool with which the Government could protect the mili-
tary from prosecution, exploit civilians, and thereby maintain its dis-
proportionate power. Therefore, the Truth Commission and the inter-
national community should firmly resist a general amnesty, which is 
likely to follow the Commission report. 
350 See id. at 55-56. 
351 See id. at 10. 
352 See HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, supra note 282, at 10. 
353Id. 
354 See id. at 11-12. 
355 See id. at 10 n.l. 
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3. International Law 
a. International Treaties Regarding Amnesties356 
Various international and regional treaties implicitly prohibit the 
granting of an amnesty in Guatemala.357 These treaties explicitly estab-
lish both substantive human rights for individuals and a corollary duty 
upon states to provide a remedy for the violation of such substantive 
human rights.358 The duty to provide a mechanism for redress in most 
treaties requires each signatory to maintain an effective mechanism 
through which victims can seek redress.359 This duty implicitly prohibits 
a state from granting an amnesty for perpetrators.360 Such an amnesty 
would be inconsistent, violative, and preclusive of the victim's right to 
redress.361 
The American Convention on Human Rights is one treaty that 
implicitly prohibits the granting of an amnesty.362 Guatemala has been 
a signatory of the Convention since 1969.363 In two separate articles, 
the Convention guarantees an individual's procedural rights. 364 First, 
Article 8 provides the right to a fair hearing before a "competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal" to determine one's civil rights.365 
This provision protects a victim's right to a civil remedy for a violation 
of his or her human rights. Any amnesty interfering with the right to 
a civil remedy would be prohibited by this provision.366 Second, Article 
356 In arguing against the granting of amnesty, one must first face the contention that 
interference with a government's treatment of its own citizens is beyond the reach of the 
international community and international law. See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 24. Such 
interference by international mandates violates a nation's sovereignty. See id. However, Nurem-
berg has established firmly that "certain grave human rights violations by a government against 
its citizens are a matter of international concern and action." Id. Thus, certain abuses carried out 
internally by a government fall within the jurisdiction of international law. See id. at 24, 50. 
357 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 24; Robert O. Weiner, Trying to Make Ends Meet: 
Reconciling the Law and Practice of Human Rights Amnesties, 26 ST. MARY's LJ. 857, 860-61 
(1995). 
358 See Weiner, supra note 357, at 860-6l. 
359 See id. 
360 See id. 
361 See id. 
362 See id.; ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 29 (further discussing the American Convention). 
363 See American Convention on Human Rights,July 18,1978, 91.L.M. 673, 673 [hereinafter 
American Convention]. 
364 See id. at 678; Weiner, supra note 357, at 862-63. 
365 See American Convention, supra note 363, at 678. 
366 See Weiner, supra note 357, at 867. "One cannot state more clearly that governments have 
an obligation to ensure a formal remedy for their victims." Id. at 864. 
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25 establishes a right to judicial protection for the individual and places 
a duty on the state to ensure that right. 367 Paragraph 1 of Article 25 
provides that the individual has a right to recourse in front of a 
competent court for violations of fundamental rights which are recog-
nized by the state constitution or by the Convention.368 This Paragraph 
specifies that this right to recourse encompasses transgressions carried 
out by the state or its agents.369 Thus, Article 25 not only prohibits an 
amnesty, but also explicitly broadens the right to recourse by including 
the right to recourse against the state.370 
b. Judicial Interpretations in the Inter-American System 
In their decisions and reports, the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights371 
have interpreted the American Convention on Human Rights to im-
pose a duty on member states372 to investigate and prosecute human 
rights abuses. 
i. The Velasquez-Rodriguez decision 
The Velasquez-Rodriguez decision373 is one such instance in which 
the Inter-American Court interpreted the Convention to establish the 
state's duty to investigate and prosecute abuses of human rights. This 
1988 case involved a Honduran student-activist who was arrested, tor-
tured, and executed by the Honduran military.374 Along with violations 
of substantive rights, the court found that the Honduran government 
367 See id. at 863; American Convention, supra note 363, at 682. 
368 See American Convention, supra note 363, at 682. 
369 See id. 
370 See id. 
371 Robert Weiner explains the relationship between the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
The Commission is an international quasijudicial body that can hear cases, make 
findings of facts and conclusions of law, and issue reports publicizing the results. It 
can also issue recommendations to governments, but it has no additional enforce-
ment power. The Commission can, however, refer cases to the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, which has binding authority over those state parties that have 
accepted its jurisdiction. 
Weiner, supra note 357, at 862. 
372 Guatemala is a member of the Inter-American System. See American Convention, supra 
note 363, at 678. 
373 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 30-32. Weiner calls Velasquez-Rodriguez, along "with 
two other cases, the first test of the Courts' contentious jurisdiction." See Weiner, supra note 357, 
at 869 n.43. 
374 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 30-32; see also Weiner, supra note 357, at 865. 
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violated its general obligation of Article 1 (1) of the American Conven-
tion to ensure these rights.375 
The court asserted that the obligation of article 1 to "ensure" 
rights places an affirmative duty on the state parties to organ-
ize the governmental apparatus and in general all the struc-
tures through which public power is exercised, so that they 
are capable of judicially ensuring the free and full enjoyment 
of human rights.376 
Part of this duty is the duty "to identify those responsible, [and] 
impose the appropriate punishment .... "377 
ii. The Argentina and Uruguay reports 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has gone fur-
ther than the Inter-American Court in ruling against amnesties.378 In 
recent years, the Commission has ruled explicitly against amnesties, 
finding that they violate the American Convention on Human Rights.379 
Specifically, in 1992 cases involving EI Salvador, Uruguay, and Argen-
tina, "the commission ruled that laws restricting or prohibiting prose-
cutions of the military ... violate the American Convention."38o The 
Commission reasoned that the Convention gave rise to a duty to prose-
cute which cannot be overruled by domestic law.381 This conclusion was 
based on the right to a remedy provided by Article 25, the right to life 
and physical integrity provided by Article 1, and the obligation to 
ensure rights provided by Article l.382 
In the Uruguayan case, the Commission rejected the primary 
argument in support of amnesties. 383 Basically, the Uruguayan Govern-
ment argued, as has the Guatemalan Government, that amnesty is a 
political mechanism which is necessary for reconciliation in democratic 
375 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 30. Article 1 (1) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights provides: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights 
and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free 
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms .... " American Convention, supra note 363, at 675. 
376RoHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 30. 
377 Id. 
378 See id. at 60-61; Weiner, supra note 357, at 862-64. 
379 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 60-61; Weiner, supra note 357, 867-68. 
380 ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 60-61. 
381 See id. 
382 See id. at 60. 
383 See id. at 61. 
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transitions because "investigating facts that occurred in the past could 
rekindle the animosity between persons and groups [and thereby ob-
struct] the strengthening of democratic institutions. "384 Nevertheless, 
the Commission rejected this contention after weighing the political 
and ethical dimensions of the amnesty provisions.385 
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO AMNESTIES 
Although "emerging declaratory law holds that blanket amnesties 
for certain grave human rights violations are illegal under interna-
tionallaw," they are often used even by U.N.-sponsored peacemaking 
as an incentive to settle civil conflict.386 The United Nations suggests 
that amnesties may be effective in reconciling a divided state and 
overcoming the past when supported by a "broad degree of national 
consensus. "387 
In this light, it seems that an international prohibition on amnes-
ties would be wholly impractical when the choice is between ensuring 
a peaceful settlement and prosecuting war criminals. However, there 
are alternatives to blanket amnesties which settle the dilemma between 
peace and prosecution.3s8 Among these alternatives are pardons and 
plea bargains.389 
A. Pardons 
There is an important distinction between pardon and amnesty.390 
Amnesty implies no investigation or acknowledgment of responsibility,391 
whereas pardon comes after investigation and acknowledgment.392 Nev-
ertheless, pardon acknowledges a victim's civil rights-acknowledg-
ment that would be lost by an amnesty-without obliterating the con-
3841d. 
385 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 61. For a thorough discussion of amnesties in the 
context of truth commissions, international human rights, and the Inter-American system, see 
generally Pasqualucci, supra note 38. 
386 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 300. 
387 ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 4, at 23. 
388 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 299-302. Furthermore, these alternatives may be more 
effective than amnesties in establishing lasting peace because they meet the primary concerns of 
both parties. See id. They meet the government's concern of avoiding the incarceration of its 
agents while also meeting the victims' concern of having the wrongs committed against them 
formally recognized by the perpetrators. See id. 
389 See id. at 300-01. 
390 See id. at 300. 
391 See id. 
392 See id. 
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viction.393 It merely "remits the penalty"394 or "suspends punishment. "395 
Furthermore, amnesty is categorical, while pardon requires "individu-
alized consideration. "396 Most importantly, a pardon incorporates many 
of the procedures of a criminal prosecution, including the acknow-
ledgment of responsibility and "public delegitimation," without impos-
ing a questionable punishment.397 In addition, this alternative satisfies 
victims, because they primarily demand acknowledgement and recog-
nition, not vengeance.398 
B. Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargaining is another mechanism which offers advantages 
over amnesty.399 In the instance of an amnesty, individuals who possess 
incriminating evidence against those most responsible for the violence 
do not have an incentive to come forward. 40o Since prosecuting authori-
ties do not have leverage over those who hold information and have 
amnesty status, prosecutors are handicapped in investigating even those 
without amnesty.401 Amnesty not only insulates foot soldiers who were 
"merely following orders," but also makes convicting commanders vir-
tually impossible. 
If plea bargaining is employed as it is in the United States crimi-
nal justice system, it may solve this shortcoming of amnesties.402 The 
authorities can bargain with rank and file perpetrators for evidence 
against those commanding the violence.403 This possibility of bargain-
393 See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1113 (6th ed. 1990). 
394Id. 
395Id. Some courts hold that a pardon "blots out" the conviction as if it never happened. See 
id. However, this view is not unanimous. See id. In fact, "the majority of cases hold that a pardon 
does not obliterate the conviction or restore the defendant's good moral character." Id. 
396 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 300-01. 
397 See id. at 300. 
398 See id. In regard to the victims and affected families who came forward, Thomas Buergen-
thai, a Commissioner of the Salvadoran effort, remarked, "One could not listen to them without 
recognizing that the mere act of telling what had happened was a healing emotional release, and 
that they were more interested in recounting their story and being heard than in retribution." 
Buergenthal, supra note 23, at 539. Similarly, Jose Zalaquett, a member of the Chilean commis-
sion, observed, "The relatives of the victims showed great generosity. Of course many of them 
asked for justice. Hardly anyone, however, showed a desire for vengeance." Jose Zalaquett, 
Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confront-
ing Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 1425, 1437 (1992). 
399 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 301. 
400 See id. 
401 See id. 
402 See id. 
403 See id. 
1997] TRUTH COMMISSIONS 329 
ing provides an incentive to those with information to come forward, 
and arms the authorities with leverage against them. Plea bargaining 
may be enough to break the oppressive code of silence and thereby 
enable prosecutors to convict those most responsible. 
Furthermore, plea bargaining meets the competing concerns of 
reconciliation and accountability that amnesty does not.404 Proponents 
of amnesty contend that prosecution of past abuse is divisive in part 
because foot soldiers will not tolerate jail sentences for acts committed 
under orders.405 The country becomes factious as individuals re-ally 
rather than reconcile. 406 Meanwhile, opponents of amnesty contend 
that amnesty allows those responsible to avoid accountability and does 
not satisfy the victims need for acknowledgement. 407 They maintain that 
while plea bargaining allows those minimally responsible to go free, it 
does not sacrifice the acknowledgment that the victims deserve or 
allow evasion of the prosecution of those ultimately responsible.408 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Mter years of civil strife and military rule, the URNG and the 
Guatemalan Government have begun to forge a lasting peace. How-
ever, before them stands the obstacle of their past and the thousands 
of victims that have suffered through the years of violence. The parties 
must face this past and provide relief to their victims. 
The URNG and the Guatemalan Government signed the final 
peace accord in December 1996.409 This is an important step toward 
lasting peace. Integral to this lasting peace is the work of the Truth 
Commission. This Commission faces challenges similar to those of the 
Salvadoran Commission, in whose wake it follows. In only a few months, 
the Commission must produce a thorough accounting of the truth, 
covering years of strife, death, and disappearances. 
In order to meet this challenge the Commission must produce a 
complete and objective report. The report must serve the needs of the 
victims, unlike the Salvadoran Commission's report, which some argue 
failed in this undertaking. If possible, the Commission should seek to 
404 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 8, at 301. 
405 See id. at 9. 
406 See id. 
407 See id at 8-9. 
408 See id. at 301. 
409 SeeJohn Ward Anderson, Pact Signing Ends War in Guatemala; Lengthy Civil Conflict Gives 
Way to Hopes for Economic Revival, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1996, at AI. 
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engage the public in its most crucial decisions and investigate not only 
the most notorious cases, but also the cases where the perpetrators 
have yet to be recognized. The Commission is also called to protect 
those who testify and the rights of those investigated. It must investigate 
all parties without bias while withstanding domestic and international 
pressures. 
In addition to producing a complete and objective report, the 
Commission faces an even greater challenge. It must ensure that the 
report is fully recognized by those groups it finds responsible for the 
abuse. This acknowledgement is vital to the healing of individual vic-
tims and society at large. To ensure such acknowledgement, the Com-
mission must strongly oppose and even argue against a blanket am-
nesty. 
Once again, Guatemala can learn from El Salvador, where the 
Government failed to acknowledge its past and the victims continue to 
suffer. Fourteen years after her family was killed in a 1981 governmen t-
conducted massacre, Salvadoran Rufina Amaya remarked: 
They have never even come to ask our pardon .... They have 
never come to explain why they did what they did, or in any 
way ever accepted the responsibility for what happened here, 
and until they do, there cannot be true reconciliation or a 
just peace here.4lO 
410 Larry Rohter, Where Countless Died in '81, Horror Lives On in Salvador, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
12, 1996, at A4. 
